This is the best diplomatic memoir I have ever read. Informed, illuminating day-to-day events with amazing candor, including remarkably honest recognition of what the author (Burns) felt to be personal mistakes as well as those carried out by the State Department.
There were many confirmatory revelations for me.
The poorly considered and destructive impact of the expansion of NATO, the “killer” being the suggested expansion of the EU and likely then NATO to the Ukraine and Georgia. Putin and Russian’s of all stripes made it clear that this was a red line that could not be crossed.
Burns was in Moscow in 1995. He writes that Talbot as well as Secretary of Defense Bill Perry worried that starting down the road to form an enlargement of NATO would undermine hopes for a more enduring partnership with Russia undercutting reformers who would see it as a vote of no confidence in their efforts, a hedge against the likely failure of reform. “We shared similar concerns at Embassy Moscow. The challenge for us,” Burns wrote, in fall 1995, “is to look past the parent government of Russia’s often irritating rhetoric and the erratic and reactive diplomacy to our own long-term self interest. That demands, in particular, that we continue to seek to build a secure order in Europe sufficiently in Russia’s interests so that a revived Russia will have no compelling reason to revise it—and so that in the meantime the ‘stab in the back’ theorists will have only limited room for maneuver in Russian politics.” Sadly, we did not follow this advice.
For a time, we pursued the “Partnership for Peace,” a kind of NATO halfway house, but we did not pursue it aggressively, nor did Russia.
Putin’s increasing inclination to see a plot against him and Russia from almost every event, including protests about his decision to continue as president, is made abundantly clear.
Burns rightly describes Putin’s (and many Russians) intent as he writes “often as preoccupied with their sense of exceptionalism as Americans were, they sought a distinctive political and economic system, which would safeguard the individual freedoms and economic possibilities denied them under Communism, and ensure them a place among the handful of world powers.”
Burns continues with these personal words that I would echo: “I like Russians, respected their culture, enjoy their language and was endlessly fascinated by the tangled history of U.S.-Russian diplomacy.”
The history of our invidious inclination to pursue regime change is honestly described. Starting with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and Iraq which Burns and most of the State Department vigorously opposed, including the war that precipitated it. He sadly writes: “Having lost the argument to avoid war, we had two main goals in shaping it and managing the inevitable risks.” They were going about “choosing between a smart way and a dumb way of bringing it (the regime change) about.” The Pentagon had taken over leadership from the State Department, together with Vice President Cheney.
The regime change went on in Libya with the overthrow of Kaddafi, not intended, but likely inevitable with the actions we took. A slippery slope it turned out to be.
Then we went on, through phone calls from Obama, telling Mubarak to step down in Egypt.
Elsewhere, Burns writes about his growing recognition of “the quality and increasing self-confidence of Chinese diplomacy.” That does not surprise me. It is exactly how I felt about Chinese leadership in the government and in business.
Burns tells the story of the negotiations which led to the anti-nuclear proliferation treaty with Iran in great detail. It was an extraordinary journey. Not perfect in the outcome, as Burns described it. They should have pushed for a longer period. But the best that could be obtained. This saga makes me doubly sorry that Trump had pulled out of it. What a hit to our credibility.
Burns is brutally honest in his assessment of how he sees the state department needing to change in the future. He confesses to its being too “cautious, reactive and detached,” too bureaucratic, not effectively tied to the Hill, not adequately conveying the importance of diplomacy to the American public through illumination of the specific accomplishments it has enabled.
He advocates greater “candor and transparency (in describing)” the purpose and limits of American engagement abroad. “It is more effective to level with the American people about the challenges we face and the choices we make than to wrap them in the tattered robe of untampered exceptionalism or fan fears of external threats. Over promising and under delivery is the surest way to undermine the case for American diplomacy.”
Or anything else for that matter.
He advocates the importance of aligning our policies with “ensuring that the American middle class is positioned as well as possible for success in a hyper competitive world, that we build open and equitable trading systems, and that we don’t shy away from holding to account those who do not play by the rules of the game.”
I applaud his summation of our relationship with Russia. “A more durable 21st century European security architecture has alluded us in nearly three decades of fitful attempts to engage post-Cold War Russia that is not likely to change any time soon—certainly not during Putin’s tenure. Ours should be a long game strategy, not giving into Putin’s aggressive score settling, but not giving up on the possibility of an eventual mellowing of relations beyond him, nor can we afford to ignore the need for guardrails in managing an often adversarial relationship—sustaining communication between our militaries and our diplomats, and preserving what we can of a collapsing arms control architecture.”
I believe very much in what he wrote next. “Over time, Russia’s stake in healthy relations with Europe and Americana may grow, as a slow-motion collision with China and Central Asia looms.”
Burns’ book shares a lot of sad tales. Beyond those I have already mentioned, there is the dispirited description of the efforts to bring the Palestinians and Israelis together. Once again, Burns and most of the state department saw our policies which favored Israel and demoted the interests of Palestine as making the creation of a two-state solution unlikely to impossible. And it has proved that. More so today than ever with Netanyahu having achieved a fourth term.
Here is a question which looms large to me in reading this memoir which Burns touches on but does not address directly: why were the State Department and its leaders unable to play a stronger role in making happen what they thought should happen.
To be sure, the outcomes were not totally bleak. While it has been unwound by the U.S, (but not the other signatories), the Iranian treaty was a diplomatic victory. So was the Paris Climate Treaty and, while he doesn’t talk about it at length, I’d imagine the Trans-Pacific Partnership was another. Tragically, all three of these accomplishments have been dismissed by the Trump administration. However, on other truly crucial events, the invasion of Iraq, the expansion of NATO with its impact on U.S.-Russia relations, Libya (though the state department as split on this), and Egypt, the beliefs of our most trained, experienced diplomats failed to carry the day.
One thing for sure. This argues for an extraordinarily strong Secretary of State. We had that in Jim Baker.
And that Secretary of State has to be respected by and aligned with the President. Again, we had that with Jim Baker and George H.W. Bush
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In just a few days Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China will meet in Vienna to discuss how to move forward with the JCPOA (Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) -- basically, the Iran nuclear deal of which William J. Burns was the primary mover opening up a "Back Channel" with Iran and enabling the P5+1 to step up into full flung negotiations... a process that might have taken years, or perhaps may have never occurred.And yet, the United States will not be at that meeting, because as Trump so eloquently stated it was "the worst deal ever."When we withdraw from the world's most pressing problems, put a hand over our mouths, and essentially walk out of the room, we leave Russia and China at the table with our closest allies, our old friends, and enable them to establish lines of communication around us, imagining a new global order that circumvents U.S. dominance, giving rise to thoughts of how things might be different without us at the head of the table.These are certainly tremulous times, and William J. Burns book could not come at a more propitious time.If you just read the back cover of this book you'll find some of the most well respected political servants of our day starting with James Baker and ending with Condolezza Rice -- interspersed are also Hillary Clinton, Henry Kissinger, Madeline Albright, John Kerry, and George Shultz. Books like this that draw the applause from such diametrically opposed political leaders of our day do not exist. You must read this book.I am just shocked that within 4 months of it's publishing that it maintains such a low comment rating here on Amazon. How is that possible? This book is a gold mine of wisdom and political history that ought to be standard reading for every foreign service diplomat and anyone looking to understand how the world really turns.But, perhaps, it shouldn't be all that surprising as Burns himself concedes:"Selling the practical virtues of diplomacy is a complicated undertaking. For all the debate about "hard power", "soft power", and "smart power" in recent years, diplomacy is most often about quite power, the largely invisible work of tending alliances, twisting arms, tempering disputes, and making long-term investments in relationships and societies. Diplomacy is punctuated only rarely by grand public break-throughs. Its benefits are hard to appreciate."Or as Kissinger states: Diplomacy "is the patient accumulation of partial successes."Still we must wake up when someone like Jim Mattis declares "... cutting funding for diplomacy would require him 'to buy more ammunition.'Burns definitely hits the nail on the head when he states that "demonstrating that diplomacy and international influence are aimed as much at facilitating and accelerating domestic renewal as they are at shoring up global order."Threading that needle and getting the American populace to really see and believe that would take a miracle, I believe, but it's true, so true.This book really does come at such an important time in our history coming off two brutal "unilateral" wars where we did what we did because we could without taking the time to win "common cause" amongst our allies. We must recapture the art of diplomacy, or risk being sidelined by the "civilized" powers of the day that continue to believe that diplomatic channels still have a primary role in how the world turns.So, in light of the important meeting in Vienna we need to pause as a nation and consider our assumptions that life will continue as it has with the U.S. at the head of the table while Russia and China begin to weigh in more heavily upon "solving" the key problems of our world today.These final words of Burns ring almost prophetic:"Pulling out of the nuclear deal alienated allies who had joined us in the effort for many years. Reimposition of U.S. sanctions in the face of opposition from partners further damaged a tool of policy already suffering from abuse, driving other countries to lessen reliance on the dollar and the U.S. financial system."Could the July 28th meeting in Vienna spark a new world order -- a way around the U.S. financial system? Probably not right away with Iran making so many missteps in the Gulf, but we need to play our cards more wisely if we want to continue to lead the world.Thank you, William J. Burns for your service to our country and for demonstrating to us all and recording it in this book the words that we all acknowledge deep down as essentially true, "Speak softly and carry a big stick, and you will go far."
Top reviews from other countries
Édition de 2018. Bcp trop vieux pour un guide
Great book
Reviewed in Belgium on February 19, 2024François Mattelaer
Good read on American diplomacy.
Reviewed in the Netherlands on May 27, 2022William C. Mahaney
Demise of the US foreign service under Trump
Reviewed in Canada on July 28, 2019